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Introduction 
The aim of this article is to analyse the effectiveness of the 
Parliamentary Front on Sport in the Brazilian National Congress 
(Chamber of Deputies and Senate – equal to Lower and Upper 
Houses). Parliamentary fronts are informal and supra party insti-
tutions created by the member of the congress with the objective 
of articulating themselves politically to act as a group capable to 
exert political clout in the legislative decision-making process with 
purpose to promote federal legislation concerning a specific topic 
(Chamber of Deputies 2005a; Sena, 2007: p.2). The configuration of 
this type of institution is a network where the relationships among 
the members are based upon several types of exchanges, such as 
access and trading of information, the negotiation of appointments, 
budget resources, prestige, votes, etc. in order to achieve a common 
network goal, related to specific legislation (Gould 1989; Burt; 
Ansell et al., 2016).
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Sports have been frequently on the agenda of the Brazilian 
National Congress since 1883 (Mendes e Codato, 2014) and have 
been featured in Brazil in the previous years as a result of invest-
ments concerning the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic 
Games, but also due corruption scandals in the world of Brazilian 
football4. 
Despite its registration in 2003, the Parliamentary Front on Sport, 
which abbreviation is FPE from this name in Brazilian Portuguese, 
has not yet been a subject of research. Actually, sport is a relatively 
under-researched area in Brazil (Guimarães, 2009). Exploring the 
groups that govern sports brings a better understanding about the 
administrative, legal and political frameworks for sport, which 
can partially explain the current stage of development of Brazilian 
sports, and point the way to improve (Mendes, 2013; Mendes e 
Codato, 2014).
This article aims to conduct a distinct analysis about the effective-
ness of FPE during the 54th Legislature (2011-2015) of the Brazilian 
National Congress. This period has been chosen because involves 
an interstice between the World Cup and Olympic Games hosted in 
Brazil, a moment in which we had a lot of financial support in sport 
in Brazil.
Considering that the aim of FPE is to improve sports legislation 
and, consequently, its members seek to exert political clout on 
decision-making spaces of the sport policy, this article seeks to 
answer: (1) “who are the parliament members that take part of 
this network?”; (2) “how they articulate themselves politically in 
a network to exert political clout?”; (3) “what are the determinant 
factors to be central in this network?; (4) “how these members 
are effective in exert political clout regarding sports legislation by 
proposing bills and approving laws?”.
4 Such as the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission formed to investigate the contract between the 
Brazilian Football Confederation and Nike in 2001 (Bombig 2014) and the scandal in 2015 involving 
the International Football Federation and the Brazilian Football Confederation (Carta Capital 2015; 
Globo 2015; Câmara dos Deputados 2015).
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Based on data on the members of the FPE collected at the 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate, we will outline and analyse the 
political clout of this network, employing three sequential proce-
dures. The first is a prosopography analysis of political elites Stone 
(1971); the second is based on network analysis (Wasserman & 
Faust 1994; Ansell et al. 2016) and the third on an analysis of the 
legislative process of the bills proposed in the sports area. 
The main contribution of this article is to analyse the Parliamen-
tary Front on Sport (FPE) for the first time and its effectiveness 
in exert political clout in the sport policy. Among the few studies 
on parliamentary fronts (PF), we have the comprehensive analysis 
of the theoretical and methodological nature of them made by 
Silveira & Silva (2019) that sought to identify the scope and stra-
tegies adopted by the PF, and established a classification for all PF 
from the 52nd to 55th Legislature in Chamber of Deputies. This 
classification allowed the comparison and expansion of the scope 
of initiatives individually achieved through specific case studies. 
Although broad, such classification did not cover specific themes 
such as sport, which they just mentioned and it was not considered 
on their study.
The article is structured into four sections. The first section is 
about the FPE in the Brazilian Congress, in order to explain what 
the parliamentary fronts and benches are in terms of political action 
in the congress. Next, we detail the research methods adopted in 
this research. Thirdly, we will analyse the network, its members, and 
the bills proposed on sports. Finally, we conclude the implications 
of our main findings. 
The Parliamentary Front on Sport – Frente Parlamentar 
Mista do Esporte (FPE)
The Parliamentary Front on Sport (FPE as abbreviation from its 
Brazilian name Frente Parlamentar Mista do Esporte) was registered 
even before the official requirement to registry Parliamentary Fronts 
in the congress, established by Act n. 69/2005 of the Chamber of 
Deputies (Câmara dos Deputados, 2005a; Câmara dos Deputados, 
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2005b). The approval of this Act was controversial, because when 
determining that the Parliamentary Front should have 1/3 of the 
members of the Congress to be registered, this action allowed the 
central group of a parliamentary front (known as bench) to be 
hidden among the other members.
Therefore, the first record of the FPE was establish on 2 December 
2013 during the 52nd Legislature, under the presidency of federal 
deputy Ivan Ranzolin (PPB-SC). The record persisted on 5 May 
2006, during the 53rd Legislature under the presidency of federal 
deputy Manuela D’Ávila (PCdoB/RS). The FPE was relaunched on 
17 August 2011, under the presidency of the former athlete of box 
and federal deputy Acelino Popó (PRB/BA) with deputy D’Ávila as 
vice-president, at that time, it comprised more than 200 deputies 
and 7 senators. In 54th Legislature the FPE was registered on 2 
September 2013 under the same direction board and comprised 
301 deputies and 25 senators, however at the end of 2014 it had 198 
deputies and 8 senators.
This front was established with the objective of producing policies 
which seek to support athletes and sports. There is no record of the 
current activities of the FPE since the entity’s website is offline, 
despite the fact it was once again registered in the 55th Legisla-
ture (2015-2019). Although registry in the Chamber of Deputies 
requires the listing of its members and statute, only the listing of 
members is available. 
The FPE is frequently referred to as the “Bancada da Bola” [The 
Bench of the Ball] what is a misunderstanding. The Bench of the Ball 
emerged in 1991 during the processing of the first law that regulate 
football in Brazil, the Law n. 8672 (6 July 1993)5, which transformed 
football clubs into private companies and regulated labour relations 
between players and clubs. This Bench emerged at that time because 
it involves deputies and senators whose campaigns were financed 
by football clubs, by the Brazilian Football Confederation itself and 
its sponsors in exchange for bills and laws which favoured football 
5 This law was dubbed the “Zico Law” in honor to Arthur Antunes Coimbra, former football player.
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clubs and the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF) in Congress, 
as shown by investigations of the Parliamentary Committee of 
Inquiry installed to scrutinize the contract between CBF with Nike 
(Câmara dos Deputados 2001; Leão Júnior, 2004; Bueno, 2008; 
Veronez, 2005; Hirata, 2011). The political clout of the Bench of the 
Ball is so strong that the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry was 
archived without a report in 2001 (Bombig, 2014). This bargaining 
characterized by a relationship between campaign financing and 
favorable bills and laws in Congress has also been identified by 
Machado (2013) regarding the Rural Bench.
In 2001, during this Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, the 
Deputy Romário (PSB/RJ)6 accused some of this members to 
disturb the investigations by own interest, asserting that they are 
corrupted deputies from the Bench of the Ball. Romário de Souza 
Faria is a former football star and World Cup winner with the Brazi-
lian team in 1994. He was elected deputed for the 54th Legislature 
(2011-2015) and reelected as senator in the 55th Legislature (2015-
2018) have been his campaign financed by the same companies 
he accused before to finance the Bench of the Ball (Perrone 2013), 
being AMBEV one of them.
In addition, the few references we found about the Bench of the 
Ball indicate that it is comprised by few congressmen, somewhere 
between 7 and 18 members (Bueno, 2008:248; Paulo, 2012; Cruz, 
2014; Damato & Resende, 2014; Rebello & Cruz, 2014; Silva, 2013; 
Sampaio, 2014) and thus cannot be conflated with the FPE, which 
currently is formed by 206 members. However, it might be diluted 
inside the FPE. 
In this way, a Parliamentary Front is not the same as a Bench. 
Both are defined as a group of congressmen that come together 
around a certain issue to act “en bloc” to exert political clout. Both 
are supra party and informal institutions, as they gather members of 
6 Romário de Souza Faria is a former football star and World Cup winner with the Brazilian team in 
1994. He was elected deputy in the 54th Legislature (2011-2015) and reelected as senator in the 
55th Legislature (2015-2018) having his campaign financed by the same companies he accused 
before to finance the Bench of the Ball (Perrone 2013), being AMBEV one of them.
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Congress from different parties and they are not registered formally 
in the regiment of the Congress. However, unlike a parliamentary 
front, a bench lacks any registration in the National Congress, and it 
is composed for a nonspecific number of members. The most likely 
hypothesis is that the Bench of the Ball is the operative core of the 
FPE. 
Methodology
The purpose of a Parliamentary Front is to exert political influence 
on a specific political issue. As such, all Parliamentary Fronts cons-
titute a network of relevant actors to this end. Thus, characterizing 
the Parliamentary Front on Sport (FPE) as a network involves not 
only analysing their members, but also how these members relate 
to the FPE and each other, including their distribution in different 
decision-making bodies related to sport in Congress and how they 
act to influence sports policy.
The research was conducted based on data around the members 
of the FPE provided by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. 
Next, there is the explanation of each part of the method used 
followed by the Table 1 which summarized the Research Design.
a) Prosopography: the socio-political profile of the members of 
the FPE
For a general overview of the members forming this network 
we begin with prosopography data relative to the profiles of all 
members, including deputies (n=198) and senators (n=8). In this 
profile we considered: age, sex, party, ideological bloc, geographical 
region represented, level of schooling and field of specialization, 
profession, political ideology, party, positions in the party, previous 
electoral positions, number of legislatures, appointments in commis-
sions (decision making instances – specifically in commissions 
related to sports and key commissions at the Congress), if there is 
a exclusive participation in FPE or whether if they participate in 
more parliamentary fronts, and associative activities to institutions 
sports-related outside de Congress.
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This characterization is important in order to highlight the parti-
cipation of senators in this particular front, as mixed parliamentary 
fronts, i.e. fronts with members from both houses, are uncommon. 
In addition, this characterization allows for the exploration of a 
series of factors that allow us to assess the network’s potential to 
exert political clout on sport policy. 
b) Network Analysis
Since the FPE is a network seeking to exert political clout, the 
evaluation of this network’s structure, based on the relationship 
between the deputies of the FPE and the decision-making spaces 
(commissions) they occupy in the National Congress, is useful in 
evaluating its effectiveness (Gould 1989; Ansell et al. 2016).
Network analysis arise as a new theory as result of concern 
amongst sociologists and anthropologists around the connections 
between individuals and how these ties create order and meaning 
within social life. Greater attention to this form of analysis began 
in the 1970s and introduced new elements through which to 
understand the dynamics of social structure, offering method and 
theory (Tichy, Tushman & Fombrun, 2009). According to network 
theory, there are multiple possible relationships among actors of a 
network. Hence, analysing the structural and relational position of 
actors provides a way to understand both a network’s functioning 
and the strategies adopted by actors within to achieve their goals 
(Masquietto, Sarcomano Neto & Giuliani, 2011; Mesquita et al., 
2008; Ribeiro & Corrêa, 2013; Tomaél & Marteleto, 2006; Wolf, 
2008; Zurbriggen, 2006).
Wasserman & Faust (1994) point out “density” and “centrality” 
as key structural measurements. The density of a network concerns 
the number of links among actors; whereas centrality refers to 
the number of links each actor creates in relation to others, in 
comparison to total number of possible links. As such, centrality is 
extracted from density, as it corresponds to the relative position of 
an actor based on the greater density of relations. 
The structure of FPE network, formed by the commissions 
occupied by its members, was analysed with the use of Pajek 
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software, version 4.01, which provided us with measurements of 
centrality for each congressman. We calculated three measures of 
centrality: centrality degree, closeness centrality and betweenness 
centrality. The centrality degree represents the number of actors 
a particular actor (actor i, for example) is connected to in relation 
to the total number of actors. Closeness centrality is related to the 
proximity of the relationship among actors. Put simply, if actor 
i is directly connected to another actor, j, the distance between i 
and j is 1. If i and j are not connected directly but are connected 
by a third actor, k, there is a path from i to j that goes through k; 
the distance therefore between i and j is two, in other words, two 
connections are necessary to link i and j. Closeness centrality adds 
all of the “shortest distances” between i and all other actors and 
weighs them against each other. Betweenness centrality takes into 
account whether a particular actor “connects” other actors, when 
betweenness centrality is high, it means that a particular actor acts 
as a “bridge” between many other actors. 
Each node in the network are one actor, which size vary accor-
ding his respective grade of centrality. The vertex of the network 
are the commissions and their size vary depending on the number 
of members. The criteria to create the network based on participa-
tion in commissions has been chosen in order to identify the rela-
tionships between the members in the congress, specifically how 
the seek to occupied relevant decision-making spheres in sports 
legislation. We know that there are informal relations that this 
analysis is incapable of capturing, also this participation in commis-
sions occurs with institutional restrictions, given that the seats in a 
commission are proportional to each party’s representation, which 
also dictates which deputy will represent it. However, these compo-
sitions can be negotiated among parties, and these appointments 
are quite dynamic, during the 54th Legislature they ranged between 
3 and 88 amongst FPE’s members, not to mention cases of members 
who entered and left a commission multiple time. 
In a separate analysis, we divided the network to create a 
sub-network and analysed only the members of the FPE network 
The effectiveness of the parliamentary front on sport in the 
Brazilian National Congress between the World Cup and the Olympic Games 129
that participated in commissions related to sports in the National 
Congress during the 54th Legislature – bimodal sub-network in 
which there are the vertices are FPE’s members and the sports 
commissions in which they participate.
c) Testing the hypothesis – the main factors to be central within 
FPE network
The prosopography data was inputted in SPSS software (version 
22) and grouped into four proxy variables (factors): political exper-
tise, party credibility, specialization in sports and membership 
(participation in sports-related institutions outside the National 
Congress). These factors were correlated to the measures of centra-
lity (centrality degree; closeness centrality and betweenness centra-
lity) through a binary regression analysis. These factors are better 
laid out in Table 1.
This regression analysis aimed to test four hypotheses to identify 
which “factor” dictated a greater centrality for a member within 
FPE network: (H1) greater political experience (expertise factor), 
(H2) greater party experience (credibility factor), (H3) greater parti-
cipation in sports commissions, which means more knowledge in 
sports-related issues (specialization factor) or (H4) greater partici-
pation in sport-related institutions outside de congress (member-
ship factor).
However, in this level of analysis we only considered deputies 
because of two factors: (1) the different internal guidelines of each 
legislative house prevented a simultaneous, coherent and compa-
rative analysis, and (2) the baseline factor in the structuring of the 
network was participation in commissions and there exists few 
mixed commissions (of deputies and senators).
The factors political expertise and party credibility were based 
on, but not exclusively, the study by Silva Jr. et al. Silva Jr. et al. 
(2013) attempted to identify the factors that explain the selection 
of congress members to occupy three different kinds of leadership 
posts within the Chamber of Deputies – president of the commis-
sion, member of the Directing Table and party leader – during the 
51st leadership (1999-2003). Recognising that this is a matter of 
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agency7, due to the many factors involved, the authors started from 
the assumption that the rationality of congress members would 
culminate in informal mechanisms of selection, producing a homo-
geneous profile of leadership that satisfies two factors. The first 
factor is political expertise, meaning greater technical knowledge 
of the procedural working of the legislative house, which in turn 
is a proxy variable formed by the following indicators: antiquity 
(number of legislatures served in Congress), political experience 
(elective posts already served), and status (first mandate or re-elec-
tion). The second factor would be political credibility, referring to 
a higher level of compromise with party organization in order to 
achieve collective goals. This proxy variable is formed by the indica-
tors party antiquity (years of filiation to the party in question), party 
migration post elections (the 1998 elections, in this case), and party 
experience (posts occupied in the party). Silva Jr. et al (2013) found 
expertise as the most prominent factor determining who occupies 
the posts of president of the commission and member of the direc-
ting table, while credibility is the factor that most influences the 
occupation of the post of party leader when compared to median 
deputies (those not occupying posts of this nature). 
In our analysis, we added more indicators to the proxy variable 
political “expertise”: the deputy’s parliamentary activity, that is, the 
appointments in commissions in general, with an specific attention 
to appointments in four key commissions in the Brazilian National 
Congress (Directing Table; Constitution and Justice Commission; 
7 In the field of Political Science and Economics, the term “agency” refers to “agent-principal problem” 
or “agency/dilemma problem”, which means the conflict of interest inherent to any relationship in 
which information is asymmetrical and incomplete. In other words, when one expects one party 
(the agent) to act in the best interest of the party (the principal), there is the problem that the 
agent – who supposedly makes decisions in the interests of the principal – is naturally motivated 
by self-interest and the interests of the agent are different than those of the principal (Ross 1973). 
Several mechanisms can be used in the attempt to align these interests, such as payments with 
commissions, profit sharing, performance evaluations or fear of dismissal. The “principal-agent” 
problem is found in most employer-employee relations as when, for example shareholders hire 
top executives. This problem was identified by Political Science in its observations of the problems 
inherent to the delegation of legislative authority in bureaucratic agencies. Another example is the 
enforcement of legislation, which is open to bureaucratic interpretation, which creates opportunities 
and incentives for the bureaucrat as an agent to deviate from the preferences and intentions of 
legislators. 
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Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum Commission; and the Parlia-
mentary Attorney’s Office). On the other hand, when it comes to the 
proxy variable “credibility”, instead of considering party antiquity 
and party migration after the election, we considered party fidelity 
during the length of each FPE member’s political career. 
In addition, we create two more factors specifically related to our 
object of analysis. The proxy variable “specialization” in sports-re-
lated issues was formed by 3 indicators: if there is education in the 
area of health sciences, that includes sports area; if there is an exclu-
sive participation in FPE, since a congress member can associate 
himself as many parliamentary fronts he wish; and appointments 
in commissions linked to sports in Congress. The proxy variable 
“membership” in institutions sports-related outside the Congress, 
seeks to verify a relationship with the issue of sports beyond the 
scope of actions in Congress. 
Thus we expect that the network will be composed by profes-
sional politicians, with expertise and credibility, that possess 
specialization and a connection to the issue of sports, in line  with 
the findings of Wolf ’s study which concluded that deputies with a 
greater number of connections resulted in greater centrality and 
political clout (Wolf 2008: p.38), in our case, political clout within 
sports legislation. 
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Table 1 – Research design
Composition of the Population (n = 198 deputies and 8 senators)
Members of the FPE during the 54th Legislature of the Brazilian National Congress (n=206)
Characteristics: age, sex, party, ideological bloc, region, education, profession, political ideology and party
Mixed Methods Analysis: Prosopography and Network Analysis
Deputies in the FPE during the 54th Legislature of the Brazilian National Congress (n=198)
Unit of 
observation
Technique
Proxy 
Variable  
Indicators Measures
Individuals 
(deputies and 
senators > n=206)
Profile Analysis
(Prosopography)
1. Expertise
A. Antiquity in Congress
B. Political Experience
C. Status of candidate 
D. Parliamentary Activity8 
E .Presence in key com-
missions of Congress 
a) Nº of legislatures in Congress
b) Nº of elective positions 
previously occupied
c) First term or re-elected
d) Nº of appointments 
in commissions 
e) Mandates in 4 key commissions 
in the Chamber of Deputies: 
Board of Directors; Commission of 
Constitution and Justice; Ethics and 
Parliamentary Decorum Commission; 
and Parliamentary Attorney General 
2. Credibility
F. Party rooting 
G. Party experience 
f) Party rooting of party migration
g) Posts in party executive board
3. Specia-
lization
H. Level and area of schooling
I. Exclusive participation in FPE
J. Activity in commissions 
related to sports
h) Some level of schooling (a 
diploma) in the level of health 
(which encompasses sports)
i) Exclusive participation in 
FPE or also in other fronts
j) Presence in commissions 
related to sports 
4. Membership
K. Union activity, sectoral or asso-
ciative activities related to sport
External relationship to sport (such 
as having been the president of 
a sports club or an ex-athlete)
Group
(n=206)
Network Analysis Centrality
Actors pointed out as 
central in the network
Degree of centrality 
Degree of closeness 
Betweenness 
Hypothesis Test (Deputies > n=198)
(H1) FPE’s members with 
greater political expertise 
display more centrality 
(H2) FPE’s members with 
greater party experience 
(credibility) are more 
central in the network.
(H3) FPE’s members more active 
in sports-related commissions and 
therefore with greater specialization 
are more central in the network
(H4) FPE’s members displaying 
membership regarding sports 
(outside congress) have more 
centrality in the network
8 The Senate did not make this specific set of data available with regard to senators, meaning that it 
is impossible to know the number of commissions they participated in during the 54th Legislature. 
They only provided the committees in which they were present in 2014, when the data was 
collected. Be that as it may, the data concerning the 8 senators of the FPE are presented just to 
provide a picture of the whole, given that they were not considered in the hypothesis test.
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d) Measuring political influence
Lopes (2013) is currently the only author, which did some kind 
of evaluation about the political clout of a parliamentary front, 
namely the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, through bills proposed 
that became laws. We made a little more than that, we measured 
political clout, termed Legislative Efficacy through the analysis of 
number of bills proposed by the FPE and, the number of bills from 
those which were approved. 
Results and Discussion
The results presented in this section refer to: (a) the profile of 
members of congress who compose the FPE; (b) the network struc-
ture they formed for decision-making in the National Congress 
(NC); (c) the testing of hypotheses between factors related to the 
political profile of these members and their respective positions in 
this network; and (d) the preliminary analysis of the FPE’s political 
influence in sports legislations produced during the specified time 
period.  In the results we consider all members, with the exception 
of hypotheses’ tests, which involve the prosopographical variables 
and only the lower house members’ (deputies) within the network, 
as explained in the methodology.  
a) Prosopography: the socio-political profile of the members of 
the FPE
Out of 206 FPE members, most are men (93%), belong to the 
liberal professions (61%) and have a university degree in humani-
ties (32%) or law (30%). They average 54 years of age, ranging from 
22 years old [Alexandre Leite (DEM/SP9), Hugo Mota (PMDB/
PB) and Wilson Filho (PTB/PB)] to 91 [Camilo Cola (PMDB/ES)]. 
Most members fall between 46 to 55 years old (n=71) and 56 to 65 
(n=67); only 42 were below the age of 45.  
The majority of FPE members hail from the Brazilian regions of 
Northeast (34%) and the Southeast (30%), followed by the South 
(16%), North (13%), and Central-West (7%).  This is interesting, as 
9 DEM, PMDB and PTB are political parties; SP, PB and ES are acronyms of the Brazilian states.
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it does not correspond to the proportions of Congress as a whole. 
The North-eastern and South-eastern region have very disparate 
levels of sports infrastructure, number of sports clubs, and state 
government investment (DaCosta, 2006a, 2006b).  The preva-
lence of the Northeast may indicate a shift in this scenario and 
provide these regions with better sports infrastructure.  Similarly 
to the Parliamentary Agricultural and Livestock Front, the member 
distributions corresponds to the regions with the most agricul-
tural production - the South, Southeast, and Center-West (Intini & 
Fernandes, 2012).
Another important issue in describing this group is the remar-
kable distribution of its 206 members across 19 different parties. 
During the 54th Legislature the Senate was composed of 16 different 
political parties and the House had 23.  The significance of the 
FPE scattering throughout 19 parties is amplified when compared 
to the Frente Parlamentar Agropecuária (FPA), as this parliamen-
tary front was considered to have the most political leverage in 
Congress (Vigna 2001; Vigna 2007; Sena 2007; Intini & Fernandes 
2012; Machado 2013) and during the 54th Legislature it contained 
17 parties and 202 members (191 lower house members and 11 
senators) (Intini & Fernandes 2012).  
These 19 parties were separated into ideological blocs (centre, left, 
right) according to Codato et al. (2015). Within the FPE the right 
has the biggest bloc (44%), followed by the left (35%).  Considering 
that the Ministry of Sport is, since its creation, a beachhead of leftist 
political parties like the PT or PCdoB10, the fact that the FPE is 
composed mostly of right-wing parties is surprising.  However, this 
proportion is similar to the proportions within 54th Legislature as a 
whole.  And it is also in accordance with Coradini (2010)Coradini’s 
findings (2010: p.249) regarding the 52nd Legislature (2002-2006), 
which emphasise the predominance of right-wing parties in spheres 
with a strong economic character, sports included.  
A summary of the FPE member’s profiles is on the Table 2 below. 
10 Ministers of Sport and respective parties: Agnelo Queiroz - PT (2003-2006); Orlando Silva - PcdoB 
(2006-2011); Aldo Rebelo - PCdoB (2011-2015).
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Table 2 – Composition of FPE members 
FPE Members during the 54th Legislature of the Brazilian National Congress (198 deputies and 8 senators =206)
Age
Sex
Political Spectrum
Region
Education
Profession
Age n Party n
Ideological 
Bloc
Level Area
22-29 3 93% ♂ PR 14
Right 44%
Northeast 34% College 77%
Law 30% Liberal Profession
61%
30-34 7 7% ♀ PSD 14 Southeast 30%
High School
11%
Humanities, 
Theology 32%
Business
24%
36-45 35 PP 13 South 16% Technical 4% Health 17%
Public Employee 
10%
46-55 71 SD 11 North 13% Primary 8%
Exact / Engineering 
/ Metallurgy 13%
Teaching 4%
56-65 67 DEM 10 Center-West 7%
Accounting and 
Management 8%
Religious 1%
66-75 22 PRB 9
76-85 3 PTB 9
86-95 1 PSC 6
PPS 3
PTdoB 1
PT 33
Left 35%
PDT 10
PSB 11
PC do B 8
PROS 8
PMN 2
PMDB 23
Center 21%
PSDB 18
PV 3
Source: Author, based on Congress data according to classification by Codato et al. (2015).
b) Network Analysis of Parliamentary Sports Front
To analyse the network, we created a database using Pajek 4.01 
in which the nodes and vertexes were composed by members and 
the decision-making spheres (commissions) occupied by them in 
Congress.
In analysing this network, we broke it into a subnetwork with 
members who were in commissions related to sports (Figure 1). 
During the 54th legislature, ten commissions related to sports were 
identified in the Lower House (LH) and the Upper House (UH):
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1. Permanent Commission on Tourism and Sports (CTUR) in 
the LH;
2. Permanent Commission on Sports (CESPO) in the LH;
3. Special Commission established by Law nº 2330/2011, World 
and Confederations Cups (COPAS) in both houses; 
4. Special Commission established by Law nº 5201/2013, Suppor-
ting Olympic Sports Program (PROFORTE) in the LH;
5. External Commission on the 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympics Legacy (LEG. COPA JO) in the LH; 
6. Permanent Commission on Education, Culture, and Sports in 
the UH; 
7. 2014 World Cup, 2016 Olympics and Paralympics 2016 
Temporary Subcommittee (CDRCOOL) in the UH; 
8. Permanent Subcommittee on 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympics Monitoring in the Senate (CMACOPA or CMACO-
POLIM) in both houses;
9. Protection of Capoeira Mixed Parliamentary Front 
(CAPOEIRA) in both houses;  
10. Mixed Parliamentary Front for Sports (FPE) in both houses.
Among the 206 FPE members, 66 worked in these 10 sports 
commissions.  When we analysed the importance of this sub-net-
work, we identified 22 members with an increased number of 
connections (18) with other network members, a result of their 
joint efforts in other decision-making mechanisms.  Of these 22 
members, 13 are connected to one or more sports commissions, 
and 8 of these are more important in this sub-network due to their 
simultaneous presence in 3, 4, or even 5 other commissions.  The 
members who participate in one or more networks serve as bridges 
between these different networks or communities, as proposed by 
Burt (1995). This intermediation determines the degree of influence 
of these actors regarding the level of cohesion of the FPE within 
different decision-making spheres in Congress.  
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Figure 1 – FPE sub-network: FPE members (n=66) connected to sport-related 
commissions during the 54th Legislature. 
Legend of the figure – The bigger circles in orange and blue (vertexes) represent the 10 commissions related to sports currently 
functioning in Congress during the 54th Legislature (2011-2015).   The size of these bigger circles is proportional to the number 
of participants in each commission.  The smaller circles in purple (nodes) represent the FPE members who were present in these 
commissions.  The size of these smaller circles is proportional to the number of connections each congressman has with other 
network members. 
These issues revive the argument that the FPE is not the same 
as the Bench of the Ball, since 206 members can not represent very 
specific interests (Gould 1989; Intini & Fernandes 2012; Ansell et 
al. 2016). However, FPE may contain the Bench of the Ball, as its 
main actors can be the principals of the Bench. Some of the charges 
against the Bench of the Ball indicate that it is composed by 7 
Alessandra Dias Mendes e Adriano Nervo Codato138
members  (Cruz, 2014; Damato & Resende, 2014; Rebello; Sampaio, 
2014), almost the same number of congressmen singled out in this 
subnetwork analysis, obviously it must consider a possible variation 
or change in the composition of the Bench of the Ball.  It is impor-
tant to highlight that Deputy Renan Filho (PMDB/AL) was the only 
one founded as a central member within the network that coincided 
as one of the suitable ones in the accusations on the Bench of the 
Ball (Rebello & Cruz 2014).
The 8 main congressmen inside the FPE’s subnetwork, all 
members of the Lower House, were simultaneously present in three 
or four other commissions related to sports.  In three commissions 
related to sports we have: Danrlei Hinterholz (PSD/RS) (former 
athlete), Delegado Protógenes (PCdoB/SP), Marcelo Matos (PDT/
RJ), Renzo Braz (PP/MG), Renan Filho (PMDB/AL) and. In four 
commissions related to sports we have: Acelino Popó (PRB/BA) 
(a former athlete, four-time world champion of boxing), André 
Figueiredo (PDT/CE) and Wanderley Deley (PTB/RJ). 
Of the main subnetwork members, most were in their first 
mandate in the 54th Legislature: Acelino Popó (PRB/BA), Danrlei 
Hinterholz (PSD/RS), Delegado Protógenes (PCdoB/SP), Marcelo 
Matos (PDT/RJ), Renzo Braz (PP/MG) e Renan Filho (PMDB/AL). 
Wanderley Deley (PTB/RJ) was already in his third mandate and 
André Figueiredo (PDT/CE) in his second. Wanderley Deley (PTB/
RJ) was an athlete and soccer coach in five different sports clubs, 
a member of five different parties, Municipal Sports Secretary in 
Volta Redonda/RJ (1997-2002), twice vice-party leader, and had 22 
appointments in 14 different commissions in the 54th Legislature. 
André Figuereido (PDT/CE) does not have any openly declared 
relationship with sports, never switched parties, and had 8 party 
positions, 31 appointments in 20 commissions, including the Ethics 
Council and the Strategic Center of Debate and Planning during the 
54th Legislature.  Considering these characteristics, we can say that 
besides being important figures in the FPE’s network, Wanderley 
Deley (PTB/RJ) has political expertise and André Figueiredo (PDT/
CE) has political expertise and credibility within the party.  
However, if “political ‘expertise’”, “party ‘credibility’”, “‘specializa-
tion’ in the areas of sports”, and “‘membership’ in sports institutions” 
are four factors that dictated a greater centrality within the network, 
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that is something that only a test of hypotheses can prove.  Let us see 
the result in the next section.  
c) Testing the hypothesis 
Through factorial analysis, based on the prosopographic varia-
bles of political careers, we created factors that synthesized the poli-
tical profiles of the FPE members (FPE=206), as presented below 
and summarized in Table 3.  However, it is important to note that 
for this test only the deputies (n=198) were considered as explained 
in the methodology. First, we present the results of the indicators of 
each factor.
Table 3 – Results of indicators for each factor of the factorial analysis for FPE members 
(n=206). Factors were: “Political Expertise”, “Party Credibility”, “Specialization in Sports”, 
and “Membership in sports institutions outside Congress”.
Proxy Variables
(Factors)
Indicators Results n %
1. Expertise
A. Congressional Antiquity
1 Legislature 99 48%
2 Legislature 40 19%
3 Legislature 31 15%
4 Legislature 18 9%
5 Legislature 12 6%
6 Legislature 5 2%
7 Legislature 1 0.5%
Total 206 100%
B. Political experience 
1 Elected mandate 33 16%
2 Elected mandate 31 15%
3 Elected mandate 24 12%
4 Elected mandate 15 7%
5 Elected mandate 12 6%
6 Elected mandate 8 4%
Total 123 60%
Of the 123 that had previous elected mandates, those were in:
Municipal level 93 76%
State level 74 60%
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Federal level 9 7%
C. Status 
First mandate 98 48%
Re-elected 108 52%
Total 206 100%
D. Parliamentary Activity 
(Commission Mandates during 
the 54th Legislature)
Up to 5 mandates 2 1%
6 to 10 mandates 16 8%
11 to 20 mandates 71 36%
21 to 30 mandates 58 29%
31 to 40 mandates 35 18%
41 to 50 mandates 13 7%
51 to 60 mandates 1 1%
61 to 70 mandates 1 1%
71 to 80 mandates 0 0%
81 to 90 mandates 1 1%
Total 19811
However, the number of different commissions in which they participated was:
Up to 5 commissions 40 20%
6 to 10 commissions 64 32%
11 to 20 commissions 80 40%
21 to 30 commissions 17 9%
31 to 40 commissions 2 1%
41 to 50 commissions 1 1%
51 to 60 commissions 2 1%
Total 206 100%
E. Presence in key Commissions
Board of Directors at the Chamber of Deputies 8 4%
Constitutional and Justice Commission 102 50%
Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum Commission 27 13%
Parliamentary Prosecutor 5 2%
Total 142 69%
2. Credibility F. Party entrenchment
Party Entrenchment 90 44%
1 Party Affiliation 90 44%
Party Migration 116 56%
2 Party Affiliation 36 17%
3 Party Affiliation 38 18%
4 Party Affiliation 18 9%
5 Party Affiliation 15 7%
6 Party Affiliation 2 1%
7 Party Affiliation 4 2%
11 This information was not made available by the Upper House (senators). Therefore, it was only 
possible to present information concerning deputies (see note 16). It is important to remember, 
as mentioned in point (d), that often the deputy would enter then exit the same commission 
multiple times during the legislature.
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8 Party Affiliation 2 1%
9 Party Affiliation 1 0%
G. Party experience12
1 Party Job 48 23%
2 Party Job 44 21%
3 Party Job 18 9%
4 Party Job 17 8%
5 Party Job 13 6%
6 Party Job 8 4%
7 Party Job 5 2%
8 Party Job 4 2%
9 Party Job 4 2%
10 Party Job 3 1%
11 Party Job 1 0%
12 Party Job 2 1%
13 Party Job 2 1%
Total 169 82%
3. Specialization
H. Education in Health/Medicine Some level of schooling in any area of health 28 17%
I. Exclusive Participation in the FPE 
Participates exclusively in the FPE 
and not in any others 
147 71%
J. Performance in sports-related commissions during the 54th Legislature (2011-2015)13 66 32%
4. Membership
K. Union activism, representative of class and membership associated with sports; 
any other external relation to sports (club president or former athlete for example)
10 5%
Regarding the factor political “expertise”, for the indicator (a) 
congressional antiquity, 55% of congressmen are over their second 
term.  However, there are some over their seventh term [Arnaldo 
Faria de Sá (PTB/SP)]. With respect to (b) political experience, 60% 
have served in another position, be it municipal, state, or federal 
and as (c) status, 52% are re-elected for two or more terms.  
Concerning (d) parliamentary activity indicator, each FPE 
member has participated in 12 commissions on average during the 
54th Legislature.  The variation ranges from at least 3 [Dr. Adilson 
Soares (PR/RJ)] and at most 87 [Arnaldo Faria de Sá (PTB/SP)]. 
Regarding indicator (d), it is important to point out that (1) only 
5 congressmen have been a part of 30 or more commissions; (2) 
the participation in decision-making spheres was considered as a 
12 The party jobs in question involve positions such as: Treasurer; Municipal, State and/or Federal party 
convention Delegate, Party leader; Party Bloc Leader; (Municipal, State, and/or Federal) Directory 
President. 
13  These commissions are the 10 commissions related to sports during the 54th Legislature (2011-
2015) and represented in Figure 1.
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relevant element for the purposes of this paper, nevertheless such 
commissions are often created to discuss a specific bill which vary 
in complexity and duration.  Anyhow, the congressmen’s perfor-
mance in a number of simultaneous commissions constitute a data 
point which may be studied further by future research.  
In both houses, the number of commissions is constantly 
changing, especially the temporary ones, which makes it difficult 
to compare precisely the number of commissions in which the 
FPE members participate.  The data provided by the Lower House 
and the Upper House show this imprecision (Table 4), meanwhile 
FPE members are present in more commissions than the official 
number disclosed.  Despite this, we see a strategic occupation by 
FPE members in decision-making spheres.
Table 4 – Commissions in which FPE members participate in relation to total 
commissions of the 54th Legislature (2011-2015), both sets of data were provided by 
the House and the Senate. 
In the House
FPE Members in Total Commissions in the House
22 Permanent Commissions 22 Permanent Commissions
209 Special Commissions* 101 Special Commissions* 
22 External Commissions 23 External Commissions 
17 CPIs* 4 CPIs*
1 Mixed Commissions 3 Mixed Commissions 
67 Parliamentary Fronts 210 Parliamentary Fronts 
11 Working Groups 13 Working Groups 
4 Councils* 1 Council*
1 Parliamentary Prosecutor 1 Parliamentary Prosecutor
In the Senate
FPE Members in Total Commissions in the Senate
11 Permanent Commissions 23 Permanent Commissions
40 Sub commissions 81 Sub commissions
8 Mixed Commissions There is no information available*
9 Councils There is no information available *
18 CPIs 57 CPIs
20 External and temporary Commissions 112 External and temporary Commissions
9 Representative Commissions and others 
(such as the Parliamentary Prosecutor)
There is no information available *
38 Veto Commissions 75 Veto Commissions
Source: Author, based on data provided by the House and Senate.
*The inconsistencies between the number of commissions with FPE members and total number of commissions is due to information dis-
closed by Congress itself. In any case, we kept the information to denote the scattering of the FPE in decision-making spaces in the Congress.
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Regarding (e) presence in key commissions in Congress, focal 
points of political articulation include: 
• 50% (n=102 > 95 deputies and 7 senators) compose the Cons-
titution and Justice Commission (CCJ), a very important 
commission in both houses; 
• 13% (n=27; 22 deputies and 5 senators) of FPE members are 
in the Ethics Commission in both houses; 
• 4% (n=8 > 7 deputies and 1 senator) are members of the Mesa 
Diretora in both houses, the most important organ of the 
Brazilian National Congress;
• 2% (n=5; 4 deputies and 1 senator) are members of the Parlia-
mentary Prosecutor’s Department in both houses. 
The party “credibility” factor of FPE members shows that (f) 
party entrenchment happened in 44% (n=90) of congressmen.  Of 
the 56% (n=116) that had different party affiliations, they ranged 
from 2 to 9 parties.  Related to (g) party experience, 82% (n=169) 
had some party position.  
The “specialization” factor in sports showed that only (h) 17% 
(n=28) had some education at any level of health sciences.  Only 
one, deputy Paulo Rubem Santiago PDT/PE had a degree in Physical 
Education.  Regarding (i) exclusive participation in FPE, only 29% 
participated in the FPE alone, 71% (n=147) participated in other 
fronts, and 24% (n=50) were presidents in them, a relevant fact for 
their profiles and the network structure related to political clout. 
Concerning (j) performance in commissions related to sports, 32% 
(n=66) belong to a commission that deals with sports.  
As regards to “membership” in sports institutions outside 
Congress (k), only 5% (n=10) of FPE members were involved with 
sports that did not concern their parliamentary activities, whether 
as an athlete, member of a coaching team, or manager of a sports 
club.
After using factorial analysis to group the prosopographic varia-
bles as indicators according to these theoretical dimensions (exper-
tise, credibility, specialization, and membership), we employed 
binary logistic regression to test the following hypotheses:
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(H1) FPE members with greater political experience (exper-
tise), and consequently a longer political career including 
congressional antiquity, greater previously elected terms, 
higher parliamentary activity in Congress, and greater parti-
cipation in key commissions; would hold greater “knowledge 
of the legislative machine” and thus occupy central positions 
in the network;
(H2) FPE members with greater party credibility, that is, party 
entrenchment and party positions would occupy central posi-
tions in the network;
(H3) FPE members with more specialized knowledge, due 
to their education in health sciences, performance in sports 
commissions, and exclusive participation in the FPE would 
possess greater specialization in sports and would occupy 
central positions in the network;
(H4) FPE members with memberships in sports institutions 
outside Congress would occupy central positions in the 
network. 
Regarding the factors and the Centrality Degree in the network, 
the chi-square test shows that the model (group of independent 
variables = factors) is significant (p<0.01) and explains 28% to 38% 
of the dependent variable (centrality), and correctly classifies 76% of 
cases. The H1 (p<0.01) and H2 (p<0.01) hypotheses were confirmed, 
that is, expertise and specialization are statistically significantly 
related to the deputies’ Centrality Degree in the FPE network.
Regarding the Closeness Centrality Degree in the network, the 
chi-square test shows that the model (group of independent varia-
bles = factors) is significant (p<0.01) and explains 29% to 39% of 
the dependent variable (relative degree of closeness), and correctly 
classifies 74% of the cases.  The H1 (p<0.01) and H2 (p<0.01) hypo-
theses were confirmed, that is, expertise and specializations were 
statistically significant and are related to the deputies’ Degree of 
Closeness Centrality in the FPE network (n=198).  
Regarding the Degree of Betweenness Centrality in the network, 
the chi-square test shows that the model (group of independent 
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variables = factors) is significant (p<0.01) and explains 19% to 26% 
of the dependent variable (degree of betweenness), and correctly 
classifies 69% of the cases. The H1 (p<0.01) and H2 (p<0.01) hypo-
theses were confirmed, that is, expertise and specializations were 
statistically significant and are related to the deputies’ Degree of 
Betweenness Centrality in the FPE network (n=198).  
Regarding party credibility, this was not significant to any of the 
centrality types, possibly because the FPE is a supra party institu-
tion, it means, it is not affiliated to any specific parties.  Regarding 
membership, we expected it to contribute to one of the three types 
of centrality, but this did not happen, probably because the level of 
membership in sports institutions outside Congress was low (5%).  
When analysing the hypotheses, it becomes evident that know-
ledge of the legislative machine (expertise) is the crucial factor, not 
only for being elected to positions in the Houses, as shown by Silva 
Jr. et al (2013), but also for centrality in a network such as the Parlia-
mentary Front on Sport. Even though, technical knowledge of the 
matter at hand (specialization in sports) was also a relevant factor.  
d) Measuring political clout – Legislative Efficacy of FPE
The FPE members were responsible for 94 (61.43%) of 153 bills 
proposed for legislation in sport. In this period only 30 legislative 
proposals have become laws, 25 (83.33%) of which are authored by 
the Executive Power; from the 9 legislative proposals with parti-
cipation of the Legislative Power in the 54th Legislature, the FPE 
members were authors of 5 of these propositions, representing a 
Legislative Efficacy of 55%.
When compared with the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, the 
only Parliamentary Front from which we have some similar data 
(Lopes 2013), they were effective in approving 3 bills in 2 legisla-
tures, while the Sports’ MPs approved 4 bills in 1 legislature.
Conclusion 
Despite the proliferation of parliamentary fronts in Congress, 
there remains a dearth of studies on their effectiveness in produ-
cing legislation (Vogel 2005; Lopes 2013), political clout, political 
Alessandra Dias Mendes e Adriano Nervo Codato146
performance, and cohesion (Lopes 2013). We know very little of 
their true capacity of political articulation in promoting a specific 
public policy.  
The objective of a parliamentary front is to develop strategies to 
occupy decision-making spheres and reinforce its power to exert 
political clout, such group consist of a network of actors.  This 
article sought to analyse the effectiveness of the Brazilian Parlia-
mentary Front on Sport by identifying the structure of the FPE by 
the analysis of the attributes of its individuals, how they articulate 
themselves politically, how they position themselves in decision-
-making spheres in Congress and what is their influence in building 
sports legislation.  
We found that the FPE has a considerable capacity in Congress, 
especially when we compare our data with the few data available on 
the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (Intini & Fernandes, 2012) 
and on the Evangelical Front (Lopes, 2013).
Taking into account our analysis we found that FPE: 
• Is composed by political professionals, with long careers and 
specialization in sports;
• Has national representation, as it has members of 26 out of 27 
federative units;
• And occupies a strategic position in several decision-making 
spheres, due to the presence of FPE members in different 
commissions, parties, and internal and external activities 
related to sports what is determinant for its objective (exert 
political clout), as pointed also by Cascione (2018);
• As well as their presence in important commissions such 
as the Board of Directors, the Constitutional and Justice 
Commissions and Investigative Parliamentary Commissions;
• Also, a strong legislative performance with a legislative effec-
tiveness of 55%;  
• Of the 206 members of the FPE, 66 were involved in decision-
-making spheres related to sports (ten commissions). Of these 
66, 8 were identified with greatest centrality.  
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It is possible to conclude that the parliamentary front is spread 
in the congress, what is determinant for its objective (exert political 
clout), also the core group that we found shows that there is a much 
smaller organizational core than might be diluted and hidden in the 
front, what is also pointed by Cascione (2018).
This last data shows that there are other explanatory factors for 
the network’s connections that go beyond the specific interest in 
promoting sports legislation, and these factors can be related to the 
cooperation between network actors for other interests (Chaserant, 
2003; Balestrin & Vargas, 2004, p.209).  This fact demands more 
research in order to explain this cooperation, especially concerning 
deputies pointed out by the media as being members of the Bench 
of the Ball (Bombig, 2014; Sampaio, 2014) and the ones listed here 
as professional politicians, central in the network.  
When analysing the hypotheses relating to the determining 
factors for centrality of an FPE member, we verified that knowledge 
of the congressional machine and its inner workings and proce-
dures (expertise) and technical knowledge of sports (specialization) 
proved to be the main factors.  This finding lead us not just to a new 
method to study this kind of institutions but also to a theory about 
the main factors to be central in such a network. Cervi (2015)
The conclusions of this study were limited by the scarcity of 
studies on parliamentary fronts to be used as parameters, mean-
while, turns it original and gave us an overview about how they 
work. Its main contributions were a first analysis of Parliamentary 
Front on Sport; a mixed method to measure the effectiveness and 
political clout of a parliamentary front, through its capacity of 
political articulation utilizing prosopography analysis and network 
analysis combined, and legislative efficacy as more precise analysis. 
Also, a theory about the main factor to be central in a political 
network like this. Our method can be replicated to analyse or make 
comparisons with other parliamentary fronts or similar forms of 
coordinated political action. 
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Abstract
Parliamentary Fronts (PF) are supra party institutions in the Brazilian 
National Congress (BNC) that aim to exert political clout in policies 
regarding a specific subject. Although seldom studied, these institutions 
have proliferated, and their number peaked in the 54th legislature (2011-
2015) with a tally of 210. In this article, we analyse the effectiveness of the 
Mixed Parliamentary Front for Sports (FPE), which comprises 198 federal 
deputies (from 513) and 8 senators (from 81). As method we combined: 
prosopography of its members; network analysis formed by the decision-
making arenas occupied by them at BNC; analysis of their political clout in 
the legislation for sport. Our results indicate a network mainly comprised 
of right-wing parties and professional politicians, which suggests a strong 
potential of political clout. Four theoretical constructs from their profile 
characteristics were correlated to the centrality within the network, which 
showed that political expertise and political specialization were crucial 
factors. We found 8 central members, reinforcing arguments from literature 
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which proposed the existence of an operative nucleus within PF. In 
relation to the clout in the formulation of sport policy, the representatives 
belonging to the front were responsible for 94 (61%) proposals of the total 
of 246 bills presented in the field of sports. Moreover, they are not effective 
in approving these propositions, although more effective than others 
PF. Nevertheless, this research gave us a better understanding of policy 
formulation in complex political arenas, inaugurating a method and a 
theory to study effectiveness and centrality of this kind of institution.
Keywords: sport policy, political institutions, political clout, prosopography, 
factorial analysis, network analysis. 
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